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COMMENT 
MARYLAND'S WARRANTLESS INSPECTION LAWS: 
A WARRANTLESS EXPECTATION 
OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 
The fourth amendmentl to the United States Constitu-
tion proscribes "unreasonable searches and seizures" and 
requires that warrants be issued only upon probable cause. 
There is no distinction drawn between an administrative 
inspection and a criminal search. Yet, a different treatment 
has evolved in Supreme Court decisions on these two 
classifications of searches. This Comment addresses Mary-
land's warrantless administrative inspection laws in light of 
the standards that the Court has applied to similar enact-
ments. 
I. IMMINENCE OF A CHALLENGE TO MARYLAND LAW 
On March 23,1977, the Court of Appeals of Maryland rendered 
its decision in Comm'r of Labor & Ind: v. Fitzwater.2 The facts were 
simple and undisputed.3 In April of 1976, a deputy boiler inspector4 
in Maryland's Division of Labor and Industry5 learned that a boiler 
had exploded in the Fitzwater Furniture Company. The exploded 
boiler was located in an area of the premises not open to the public. 
The inspector telephoned the proprietor, Fitzwater, to inform him 
that pursuant to the Maryland Boiler and Pressure Vessel Safety Act 
(the "Act"),6 a boiler inspection would be conducted the next day. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides: 
The right of the peop1e to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 
2. 280 Md. 14, 371 A.2d 137 (1977). 
3. Id. at 16, 371 A.2d at 138. 
4. The Maryland Boiler and Pressure Vessel Safety Act is set forth in MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 48, §§ 167-180 (Supp. 1977). Section 176 of the Act addresses the 
authority of designated state officials to conduct warrantless inspections for 
compliance purposes and limits that authority to "the chief boiler inspector or 
any deputy boiler inspector." It was not disputed that the deputy boiler inspector 
was a duly authorized, state official under the Act. 
5. The Division of Labor and Industry is a part of the Licensing and Regulation 
Department of the State uf Maryland. MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 1 (Supp. 1977). 
6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48, § 176 (Supp. 1975) which, at that time, provided: 
Access to premises; frequency of inspections; interpretation and 
application of inspection requirements; by whom inspections made; 
hydrostatic tests; inspection during construction or field assembly. 
(a) Access to premises for purpose of inspection. - The chief boiler 
inspector or any deputy boiler inspector shall have free access, during 
reasonable hours, to any premises in the State where a boiler or pressure 
vessel is being constructed for use in or is being installed in this State for 
the purpose of ascertaining whether such boiler or pressure vessel is 
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Upon the inspector's arrival, however, Fitzwater refused him entry 
because the inspector did not have a search warrant. When the state 
petitioned the circuit court to issue an injunction ordering Fitzwater 
to admit the inspector, the court declared the warrantless inspection 
procedures in section 176 of the Act unconstitutional as an 
infringement on Fitzwater's fourth amendment rights. 7 The state 
appealed, and the court of appeals granted certiorari. 
The court of appeals never reached the constitutional question. 
While the state devoted its energies to showing that the Act was in 
accord with case law regarding permitted, warrantless administra-
tive inspections,s the court of appeals focused its attention on the 
wording of the Act.9 Section 176 permitted warrantless inspections 
only in two instances. The first was when a boiler or pressure vessel 
was being constructed or installed. The second instance arose when 
the certification of a boiler or pressure vessel expired. Since the 
requested inspection here was for the purpose of investigating an 
accident, it fell under neither category; the inspection was conse-
quently not authorized by the Act.lO It thus became unnecessary for 
the court of appeals to decide the constitutional issue of the 
warrantless inspection provisions in the Act. The trial court's denial 
of the state's petition for an injunction was, therefore, affirmed, but 
a constitutional test of Maryland's laws authorizing warrantless 
administrative inspections was postponed. 
During the 1977 legislative session, the Maryland General 
Assembly quickly responded to this newly discovered loophole in the 
reach of the Act by amending the law to cover incidents such as 
being constructed and installed in accordance with the provisions of this 
subtitle. 
(b) Time of inspection; interpretation and application of inspection 
requirements. - On and after July 1, 1969, each boiler and pressure 
vessel used or proposed to be used within this State, except boilers and 
pressure vessels exempt under § 172 of this subtitle, shall be throughly 
[sic] inspected as to their construction, installation and condition, as 
follows: 
(1) Power boilers and high pressure, high temperature water boilers 
shall receive a certificate inspection annually and shall also be 
externally inspected annually while under pressure, if possible. 
(2) Heating boilers shall receive a certificate inspection biennially. 
(3) Pressure vessels subject to internal corrosion shall receive a: 
certificate inspection biennially. 
7. 280 Md. at 16, 371 A.2d at 138. The fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution applies to the states through the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
8. In its Fitzwater brief, the state presented only one question: "Does the duty of 
owners and operators of commercial boilers to submit to periodic inspections of 
their boilers by state boiler inspectors not having a search warrant violate the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution?" Brief for Appellant at 2. 
9. Fitzwater raised the argument that the Act was not applicable to this situation 
involving an exploded boiler. Brief for Appellee at 4-5. 
10. 280 Md. at 18, 371 A.2d at 139. See note 6 supra. 
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those m Fitzwater.ll The basic constitutional question, however, 
remains to be decided. The stage is now set for constitutional 
scrutiny of the Act's warrantless inspection provisions. 
The question of warrantless administrative inspections is not 
limited merely to the provisions of Maryland's Boiler and Pressure 
Vessel Safety Act.12 Also authorized by various Maryland statutes 
are warrantless inspection procedures relating to such diverse 
subjects as honey bees, weights and measures, pesticides, sod, fire 
prevention, mistreated animals, cantaloupes, turf grass, and 
chickens.l3 Maryland has also enacted an occupational safety law14 
11. Compare the previous version of § 176 accompanying note 6 supra with the 
following revised version in MD. ANN. CODE art. 48, § 176 (Supp. 1977): 
Access to premises; frequency of inspections; interpretation and 
application of inspection requirements; by whom inspections made; 
hydrostatic tests; inspection during construction or field assembly; 
inspection and investigation of accidents and explosions. 
(a) Access to premises for purpose of inspection. - The chief boiler 
inspector or any deputy boiler inspector shall have free access, during 
reasonable hours, to any premises in the State: 
(1) Where a boiler or pressure vessel is being constructed for use in or is 
being installed in that State for the purpose of ascertaining whether 
such boiler or pressure vessel is being constructed and installed in 
accordance with the provisions of this subtitle; 
(2) Or for the purpose of conducting an inspection or investigation of 
any accident or explosion involving boilers or pressure vessels; 
(3) Or conducting any inspection required under the provisions of this 
subtitle. 
(f) Inspection and investigation of accidents and explosions. - The 
chief boiler inspector or deputy boiler inspector shall inspect and 
investigate, upon notification or information, accidents and explosions 
involving boilers or pressure vessels provided for under this subtitle. 
12. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48, §§ 167-180 (Supp. 1977). 
13. Among the various Maryland provisions authorizing warrantless inspections are 
the following found in the MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN.: 
§§ 3-105(a)(1) and 3-113(a) (1974) (Regulation of Infectious and Conta-
gious livestock and Poultry Diseases); § 3-405(b) (Supp. 1977) (Importa-
tion of Cattle or Swine); § 4-210 (1974) (Maryland Wholesome Meat Act); 
§ 4-215(b) (1974) (Maryland Poultry Products Inspection Act); §4-310(a) 
(1974) (Maryland Egg Law); § 5-205 (Supp. 1977) (Pesticide Applicator's 
Law); § 5-306(a) (Supp. 1977) (Plant Disease Control); § 5-405(a) (1974) 
(Mosquito Control); § 5-504 (1970) (Honey Bees); § 6-106(a)(e) (1974) 
(Maryland Commercial Feed Law); § 6-206(a)(e) (1974) (Maryland 
Commercial Fertilizer Law); § 6-304(b) (1974) (Agricultural Liming 
Materials and Gypsum); § 9-103(5) (1974) (Maryland Turf Grass Law); 
§ 9-203(a) (1974) (Regulation of Sale and Transportation of Seed); 
§ 9-304(a) (1974) (Potato Seed Inspection Act); § 10-503 (1974) (Trade-
marks for Farm Products); § 10-705 (1974) (Fruits and Vegetables); 
§ 10-802(a) (1974) (Maryland Apple Grade Law); § 10-903 (1974) 
(Cantaloupes); § 11-215 (1974) (Weights and Measures); and § 11-412(a) 
(1974) (Milk and Other Fluid Dairy Products). 
See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §331 (1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, §§67 
(Supp. 1977), 67A (1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48, § 181 (Supp. 1977). Compare MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 294 (1976), which specifies the procedures for procurement of 
administrative inspection warrants in regulation of controlled dangerous 
substances. 
14. MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, §§ 28 et seq. (Supp. 1977). 
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which, as the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 
(OSHA)15 permits, supplants federal enforcement. I6 This law, as 
does OSHA itself, authorizes broad inspections with no provision for 
search warrants.n Moreover, each of the Maryland counties and 
Baltimore City are empowered to enact their own ordinances, which 
may include warrantless inspection provisions and procedures.I8 It 
was just such a local ordinance that incurred Supreme Court review 
in the 1959 case of Frank v. Maryland. 19 
II. SUPREME COURT HISTORY OF WARRANTLESS ADMINIS-
TRATIVE INSPECTIONS 
Frank v. Maryland20 concerned a Baltimore City health code 
provision2I that authorized warrantless inspections of homes. A 
health department inspector was rebuffed while attempting to enter 
the Frank residence in order to pinpoint the source of a neighbor-
hood rat infestation. Resistance to inspection was a misdemeanor 
punishable by fine under the code,22 and Frank was subsequently 
charged and convicted for this offense. Frank appealed to the 
Supreme Court where, in a five-to-four decision, the Court held that 
the authorized inspection was not prohibited by the fourth amend-
ment. The Court noted the long-standing, governmental regulations 
regarding health inspections, the strict limits on the inspector's 
power to search, the indispensable importance of the inspection 
within a regulatory scheme, and the civil thrust of the penalty in 
deciding that this warrantless inspection was, at best, on the 
periphery of fourth amendment protections.23 Justice Douglas, in his 
dissent, argued that an administrative inspection differed little from 
a criminal search in that it was equally intrusive on the right of 
privacy.24 He pointed out that the fruits of an administrative 
inspection could establish the basis for subsequent criminal 
prosecution and therefore argued for application of fourth amend-
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (1970). 
16. 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1970). 
17. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 35 (Supp. 1977) with 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1970). 
18. Chartered counties are granted sufficient legislative power to enact warrantless 
administrative inspection ordinances. See MD. CONST. art. XI-A: MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 25A, §5(S) (1973); Montgomery Citizens League v. Greenhalgh, 253 
Md. 151, 252 A.2d 242 (1969). 
19. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). 
20. [d. 
21. BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 12, § 120 (1950) provided: 
Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a 
nuisance exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand entry 
therein in the day time, and if the owner or occupier shall refuse or delay 
to open the same and admit a free examination, he shall forfeit and pay 
for every such refusal the sum of Twenty Dollars. 
22. BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 12, §§ 112, 119 (1950) specified that failure to 
correct a nuisance was a misdemeanor. 
23. 359 U.S. at 372. 
24. [d. at 375 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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ment protections to all warrantless entry situations.25 Justice 
Douglas, however, recognized that "the facts that would justify an 
inference of 'probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly 
different from those that would justify such an inference where a 
criminal investigation has been undertaken."26 This flexible stand-
ard of probable cause for administrative inspections, he maintained, 
would safeguard the public interest in health and safety while 
protecting "even the lowliest home in the land from intrusion on the 
mere say-so of an official."27 
A. The Camara-See Rule 
Frank stood as the rule until 1967 when, in the companion cases 
of Camara v. Municipal Court28 and See v. City of Seattle,29 the 
Supreme Court reexamined the constitutionality of warrantless 
administrative inspections. In Camara, a San Francisco Department 
of Public Health representative entered an apartment building to 
make a routine, annual housing code inspection. Camara, in 
violation of the code30 by making residential use of the ground floor, 
refused to permit an inspection by the official without a search 
warrant. This refusal resulted in a criminal complaint. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment warrant 
requirement and probable cause standard were applicable to 
contested administrative inspections of domiciles. Specific disagree-
ment was noted with the Frank holding that the fourth amendment 
applied only peripherally to administrative inspections.31 
The See decision concerned a Seattle, Washington fire code 
provision32 that authorized routine, periodic, city-wide inspections 
without search warrants. See had refused to permit access to his 
locked warehouse unless a fire inspector obtained a search warrant. 
As a result of this refusal, See was convicted of a misdemeanor. In 
deciding that this attempted warrantless inspection was impermiss-
ible under fourth amendment standards,33 the Supreme Court 
extended the Camara decision to cover commercial premises as well 
as residences. The Court again found no overriding basis to justify 
suspension of constitutional safeguards since businessmen were held 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 383. 
27. Id. at 383-84. 
28. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Camara and See were both argued and later decided on the 
same day; one dissenting opinion applicable to both cases was prepared by 
Justice Clark, who was joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart. 
29. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
30. The attempted inspection was authorized by § 86(3) of the San Francisco 
Municipal Code. Section 503 of the Code sanctioned the right of entry without a 
provision for the procurement of a search warrant. Noncompliance with any 
provision of the Code was punishable as a misdemeanor. 
31. 387 U.S. at 530. 
32. 387 U.S. at 541. 
33. Id. at 546. 
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to have fourth amendment rights that were violated by subversion of 
the w{UTant process.34 
The majority opinions in Camara and See overruled Frank to 
the extent that it authorized warrantless administrative inspec-
tions.35 In effect, Justice Douglas's dissent in Frank was adopted. 
The starting point of the Court's analysis in both cases was the 
premise that a warrantless inspection is impermissible except within 
certain limited exceptions.36 The Court placed the burden of justi-
fying an exception to the warrant requirement upon the govern-
mental body seeking to conduct a warrantless inspection.37 In 
Camara and See situations, the Court determined that it was not 
necessary to grant government officials an additional exception to 
the warrant requirements of the fourth amendment. Instead, the 
Court opted for a procedure whereby warrants would be required and 
issued upon probable cause dependent, not on the inspector's belief 
that a particular building violated the code, but on the reasonable-
ness of the enforcement agency's appraisal of conditions in the area 
as a whole. A flexible approach to a probable cause standard was to 
. be effected by striking a balance between the need for public safety 
served by the inspection and the invasion of privacy resulting from 
the inspection.38 This accommodation between the individual's right 
to privacy under the fourth amendment and the government's 
responsibility to protect public health and welfare resulted in a 
balancing test that varied from inspection to inspection.39 Factors 
that merited consideration in a test for this flexible standard of 
probable cause included the importance of the public interest 
protected,40 the regulatory versus the criminal nature of the 
inspection,41 and the necessity for an inspection to effectuate the 
regulatory objective.42 
These resultant inspection warrants, attacked by Justice Clark 
in his dissent in Camara and See as "a newfangled 'warrant' system 
34. Id. at 543. 
35. 387 U.S. at 528. 
36. Id. at 528-29; 387 U.s. at 543. See also Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 
499 (1958). 
37. See id. at 528-29; 387 U.S. at 543. 
38. Id. at 545. Compare Clark, Some Notes on the Continuing Life of the Fourth 
Amendment, 5 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 275, 279 (1977) ("If we are going to do 
something to the fourth amendment, let us repeal it. But do not water it down 
and make people think they have something when they have nothing.") with 
Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A 
Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CAL. L. 
REV. 1011, 1012 (1973) ("The significance of Camara-See lies in the Court's 
recognition for the first time that a balancing of interests approach can be 
applied to governmental intrusion situations not involving exigent circumstan-
ces and that this balance can be reflected in a modification of fourth amendment 
protection techniques rather than their abandonment."). 
39. 387 U.S. at 536-37; 387 U.S. at 545-46. 
40. 387 U.S. at 537. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 534-39; 387 U.S. at 545. 
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that is entirely foreign to Fourth Amendment standards"43 and as 
"boxcar warrants,"44 had been addressed and dismissed in the 
Frank decision as synthetic search warrants.45 Seemingly, Camara 
and See had effectively obliterated Frank as precedent in regard to 
administrative inspections, civil in thrust, and had made issuance of 
a search warrant a mandatory component within a comprehensive, 
regulatory inspection procedure, at least where voluntary com-
pliance with access provisions was not forthcoming. 46 The potential 
repercussions of this reversal of Frank were seen as widespread. 
Justice Clark noted that the majority decision required "striking 
down hundreds of city ordinances throughout the country and 
jeopardizing thereby the health, welfare, and safety of literally 
millions of people."47 Yet, less than three years later, the first 
significant restriction48 in the scope of the Camara-See precedent 
appeared in a decision authored by Justice Douglas. 
B. The Colonnade-Biswell Exception 
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States49 involved the use of 
force50 by federal Treasury agents to effect a warrantless inspection 
for, and seizure of, illegal liquor. The inspection was carried out 
pursuant to a congressionally enacted statute that authorized 
warrantless inspections of federally licensed dealers in alcoholic 
beverages. 51 Although the Supreme Court held that the entry was 
illegal, the rationale for its holding was the lack of a provision in the 
statute to permit forcible entry by federal agents in the absence of a 
43. 387 U.S. at 547. 
44. [d. at 554. 
45. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 373 (1959). 
46. The closest the Court came to specifying that voluntary compliance must first be 
requested and refused before the warrant process is initiated was when it stated: 
[A]s a practical matter and in light of the Fourth Amendment's 
requirement that a warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems 
likely that warrants should normally be sought only after entry is 
refused unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is other 
satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry. 
387 U.S. at 539-40. 
47. 387 U.S. at 547 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
48. There were other decisions in the interim that began the erosion of a firm policy. 
See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), wherein the Court held that 
statutorily required home visits for continued eligibility in welfare programs did 
not require search warrants. 
49. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
50. The corporation's president refused to open the locked liquor storeroom where the 
agents believed illegally refilled bottles of liquor were stored. The agents then 
broke the lock, entered the area, and seized the bottles of suspect liquor. 
51. 26 U.S.C. § 7606 (1971) provided: 
(a) Entry during day. 
The Secretary or his delegate may enter, in the daytime, any building or 
place where any articles or objects subject to tax are made, produced, or 
kept, so far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining said 
articles or objects. 
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search warrant.52 The remedy for refusal to admit a government 
agent was a fine of $500.53 The majority opinion found that Congress 
had the latitude "to design such powers of inspection under the 
liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand,"54 and 
indicated that had the federal agents abided by the specifically 
designated powers in the statute, the warrantless inspection would 
have been upheld.55 The dissenting opinions would have gone 
further by finding implicit authorization in the statute to forcibly 
inspect for and seize contraband liquor.56 This deviation from the 
Camara-See rulings was rationalized as falling within a section of 
the See decision which stated that "[ w]e do not in any way imply 
that business premises may not reasonably be inspected in many 
more situations than private homes, nor do we question such 
accepted regulatory techniques as licensing programs which require 
inspections prior to operating a business or marketing a product."57 
The Court declared that these regulatory inspections, constituting a 
part of licensing programs, were to be adjudicated on a case-by-case 
basis.58 In Colonnade, both the majority and the dissent agreed with 
the government that there existed a long history of governmental 
regulation in the liquor trade, predating even the fourth amend-
ment.59 This historical regulation eased a finding that the warrant-
less inspection was reasonable, particularly since the inspection was 
part of a congressionally fashioned, regulatory plan.so Little 
guidance was provided by the Court in terms of tests or standards to 
facilitate prediction of what would be acceptable in the future under 
the "licensing programs" exception. Thus, Colonnade served merely 
to indicate some bounds to the Camara-See rule and to set the stage 
for the next major challenge, as a search for limits to the warrant 
requirement of Camara-See continued. 
The next important development occurred in United States v. 
Biswell.61 There a warrantless search was conducted by a federal 
Treasury agent under authority of the Gun Control Act of 196862 to 
52. 397 U.S. at 77. 
53. 26 U.S.C. § 7342 (1971). 
54. 397 U.S. at 76. 
55. What is most interesting is how the Court stated the rule of this case: "Where 
Congress has authorized inspection but made no rules governing the procedure 
that inspectors must follow, the Fourth Amendment and its various restrictive 
rules apply." 397 U.S. at 77. Application of this statement to Maryland's 
warrantless inspection laws would have a restrictive res.ult. 
56. 397 U.S. at 77-81. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black and Stewart joined in 
dissent. 
57. 387 U.S. at 545-46. 
58. 397 U.S. at 77. 
59. [d. at 75; id. at 80 (Black, J., dissenting). 
60. [d. at 75-76. 
61. 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
62. 18 U .S.C. §§ 921 et seq. (1970). Inspection was attempted under § 923(g), which 
provided in part: 
The Secretary may enter during business hours the premises (including 
places of storage) of any firearms or ammunition importer, manufac-
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inspect a pawnbroker's books and locked gun storeroom. In 
reversing a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision written by 
Justice Clark,63 the majority opinion analogized the government's 
interest in regulating the sale of guns to the government's concern 
with controlling liquor64 as in Colonnade. The Court concluded that 
"where, as here, regulatory inspections further urgent federal 
interest, and the possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are 
not of impressive dimensions, the inspection may proceed without a 
warrant where specifically authorized by statute."65 The Court noted 
the crucial importance of administrative inspections in regulating 
firearms, and further found it "apparent that if the law is to be 
properly enforced and inspection made effective, inspections without 
warrant must be deemed reasomible official conduct under the 
Fourth Amendment."66 See was distinguished because the purpose of 
the inspection system there was to uncover fire code violations, 
which were difficult to conceal or correct in a short time.67 In 
Biswell, the Court stated that unannounced, frequent inspections 
were essential to the regulatory scheme, and that a warrant 
requirement would severely hamper enforcement of the Gun Control 
Act.68 Justice Douglas, the author of the Colonnade majority 
opinion, stood alone in dissent in the Biswell decision. He sought to 
distinguish Biswell from Colonnade on the ground that firearms 
were not the subject of such pervasive governmental inspection as 
was the liquor industry.69 
From Biswell, a test of warrantless administrative inspections 
surfaced. First, the Court required that the inspection be made 
pursuant to authority carefully delineated by statute. "In the context 
of a regulatory inspection system of business premises that IS 
turer, dealer, or collector for the purpose of inspecting or examining (1) 
any records or documents required to be kept by such importer, 
manufacturer, dealer, or collector under the provisions of this chapter or 
regulations issued under this chapter, and (2) any firearms or ammuni· 
tion kept or stored by such importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector at 
such premises. 
63. United States v. Biswell, 442 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.s. 311 (1972). 
64. 406 U.S. at 315. 
65. [d. at 317. 
66. [d. at 316. 
67. [d. 
68. [I]f inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, 
unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential. In this context, 
the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection; and if the 
necessary flexibility as to time, scope, and frequency is to be preserved, 
the protections afforded by a warrant would be negligible. 
[d. 
69. [d. at 317-19 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas raised the additional 
issue that the search conducted was a forcible one, not truly consented to under 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). He urged that "an otherwise 
invalid search is not legitimated because' of the occupant's consent to a law 
enforcement officer's assertion of authority." 406 U.S. at 319 n. *(emphasis in 
original). 
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carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality of the search 
depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute."70 
These precise restraints incorporated directly into the regulatory 
statute itself serve to fulfill the same functions as the warrant and to 
provide the minimum safeguards required for the law to be 
constitutional. Second, the inspection could not be accompanied by 
unauthorized force.71 Furthermore, pervasive governmental regula-
tion and inspection historically within the industry would be a factor 
in judging the reasonableness of the inspection. 72 The inspection 
conducted also must pose only a limited threat to the defendant's 
justifiable expectations of privacy.73 Inspection must, in addition, be 
deemed a known "cost" of doing business within a closely licensed or 
regulated industry.74 Finally, the Biswell decision approved warrant-
less inspections when the effectiveness of the inspection system 
would be severely impaired or frustrated by a warrant requirement 
and when the protections afforded by a warrant would be negligi-
ble. 75 
Following this decision, confusion grew as to the full impact of 
Colonnade-Biswell on Camara-See. 76 Were the situations addressed 
by Camara-See and by Colonnade-Biswell totally dissimilar? The 
dichotomy seemed to be that broad health and safety inspections, 
such as those found in Frank, Camara and See, required a warrant 
in order to be valid. Conversely, inspections in regulation of licensed 
enterprises such as those found in Colonnade and Biswell could be 
conducted on a warrantless basis pursuant to enabling legislation 
that incorporated appropriate safeguards. The possibility existed, 
however, that the Court intended Colonnade-Biswell to displace 
Camara-See and give renewed vitality to Frank; therein lay the 
problem. 
70. 406 U.S. at 315. 
7l. Id. at 314. 
72. Id. at 315. 
73. Id. at 316. 
74. Id. This "implied consent" justification in Biswell is less of a fiction than that 
usually encountered. The Gun Control Act provided that each licensee be 
provided annually with appropriate revised ordinances which affect his 
obligations while defining an enforcement inspector's authority. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 921(a)(19) (1970). In this context, there is little difference between implied 
consent and a finding of actual consent. See Note, Administrative Searches and 
the Implied Consent Doctrine: Beyond the Fourth Amendment, 43 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 91 (1977), for a discussion of implied consent in administrative search 
cases. 
75. 406 U.S. at 316. 
76. See, e.g., Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative Searches and Seizures: What 
Happened to Camara and See?, 50 WASH. L. REV. 341 (1975); Note, The Law of 
Administrative Inspections: Are Camara and See Still Alive and Well?, 1972 
WASH. U.L.Q. 313. 
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C. The Lower Courts' Search for Limits 
After Biswell, there was considerable expansion in the interpre-
tation by lower courts of what constituted a regulatory scheme, an 
urgent federal interest, or a licensed industry. For example, in 
United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. CO.,77 Food and Drug 
Administration inspectors, operating under a valid statute,78 were 
held to be authorized to conduct warrantless inspections of a bakery. 
Although no federal "licensing" was involved, the court nevertheless 
considered the baking industry so pervasively regulated by Congress 
under the authority of the commerce clause79 as to merit warrantless 
inspection. 80 The Del Campo court refused to narrowly limit Biswell 
to federally licensed businesses, but rather read Biswell as permit-
ting such administrative inspections when authorized by a federal 
statute in a pervasively regulated business. 
Likewise, in Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton,81 
unannounced, warrantless, coal mine inspections authorized by the 
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 196982 were upheld. 
Inclusion under the Colonnade-Biswell exception of coal mining, 
referred to as a business "of a nearly inherently dangerous type,"83 
represented a further expansion of the concept of a pervasively 
regulated business or an urgent federal interest. Mines were not 
licensed, but the Youghiogheny court labeled mining a pervasively 
regulated industry and found consent by implication to reasonable 
intrusions. 84 Camara was distinguished because the inspections 
authorized therein were overly broad, leaving the defendant 
uncertain of his rights, uncertain of the inspector's authority, and 
uncertain of the scope of the search.85 This vagueness was not found 
in Biswell due to the specificity of the Gun Control Act, the dealer's 
awareness of the Act, and his implicit acceptance of regulation as 
but one of the burdens that had to be endured while reaping the 
benefits of the trade. In Youghiogheny, the court found "that the 
mining operators at bar have no such misapprehensions when they 
are visited by federal mine inspectors. The scope of these inspections 
77. 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972). 
78. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970). The warrantless inspection itself was conducted 
under the authorization of 21 U.S.C. § 374(a) (1970). 
79. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, d. 3. 
80. 345 F. Supp. at 1377. 
81. 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973). 
82. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970). The warrantless inspection was carried out 
pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 813(b)(l) (1970). 
83. 364 F. Supp. at 52 n.7. 
84. Id. at 50. "[LJarge governmental interests" were held to be at stake in coal mine 
regulation. The court observed that the Act itself included congressional findings 
on the seriousness of the threat to health and safety posed by unregulated 
mining. Id. at 50. 
85. Id. at 51. 
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necessarily include [sic] every aspect of mine health and safety 
conditions." 86 
In the subsequent case of United States v. Consolidated Coal 
CO.,87 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals limited the Youghiogheny 
holding to "the proposition that only inspections of underground 
portions or 'active workings' of coal mines may be performed 
without search warrants."88 In order for records and dust sampling 
cassettes from office areas to be inspected by federal investigators, 
valid search warrants were held to be constitutionally required, with 
the Camara-See flexible standard of reasonableness applying.89 
Because of the historically close, federal regulation of coal mining, 
the court of appeals found that mine operators have a lessened 
expectation of privacy where their business records are concerned.oo 
This limited expectation was found to be sufficiently protected by a 
warrant issued under the flexible standard of probable cause, 
considering the importance of the government's regulatory objec-
tives. 91 
In United States ex reI. Terraciano v. Montanye,92 a warrantless 
inspection conducted under a New York health statute93 was upheld. 
The narcotics records of a pharmacist, a licensed professional, were 
seized and the Biswell warrantless exception was extended once 
more. There was no analysis by the court of any long-standing, 
historical regulation in the profession, and the inspection was 
conducted under a state statute as opposed to the federal statutes 
found in Colonnade and in Biswell. The court found that there were 
sufficient safeguards attendant to the statute and its enforcement 
mechanism so that fourth amendment rights were not violated. This 
was the same court that had been overruled by the Supreme Court 
decision in Colonnade. 94 Since, however, "the reversal was based on 
the view of the majority that the statute there at issue did not confer 
authority for a forcible entrY,"95 the court felt it was properly 
following the guidance of Colonnade and Biswell in giving a narrow 
reading to Camara and See. 
Speaking for the majority, Justice White in Camara observed 
that although "there has been general agreement as to the 
86. Id. 
87. 560 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1977). 
88. Id. at 217 (emphasis in original). The Youghiogheny court had indicated that 
mine operators have "no expectation of privacy in the maps, books, and records 
which are maintained for and in compliance with the Mine Safety Act," and 
therefore must produce them for warrantless inspections. 364 F. Supp. at 51 n.5. 
89. 560 F.2d at 220-21. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. 493 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1975). 
93. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§3350 (McKinney 1955),3390 (McKinney 1966). 
94. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 410 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1969), reu'd, 397 
U.S. 72 (1970). 
95. 493 F.2d at 684. 
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fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment, translation of the 
abstract prohibition against 'unreasonable searches and seizures' 
into workable guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a 
difficult task which has for many years divided the members of this 
Court." 96 The succession of cases dealing with administrative 
searches, from Frank until the present day, attests to the difficulty of 
this task. An underlying, instrumental factor in the Court's previous 
considerations may have been a distinction between civil and 
criminal searches. This distinction, given a degree of recognition in 
the Frank majority decision,97 was attacked by Justice Douglas in 
his dissent.98 Later, in Camara, the Court overruled this distinction 
drawn by Frank. 99 Yet, in the case of Wyman v. James,l00 a decision 
predating Biswell, this distinction was once again raised. In 
Wyman, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York 
statute,101 which required periodic warrantless visits by social 
workers to the homes of welfare recipients. Justice Blackmun, 
writing for the majority, distinguished Frank, Camara and See as 
arising in a criminal context, while characterizing the instant case 
as an inspection for an administrative purpose.102 Justice Marshall's 
dissent in Wyman attacked this anomalous contention that only 
suspected criminals are protected by the fourth amendment: "In an 
era of' rapidly burgeoning governmental activities and their 
concomitant inspectors, caseworkers, and researchers, a restriction 
of the Fourth Amendment to 'the traditional criminal law context' 
tramples the ancient concept that a man's home is his castle."103 
Subsequently, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,l04 a 
district court provided a detailed discussion on warrantless adminis-
trative searches, postulating such a distinction between civil and 
criminal searches. 105 While this distinction may well have been an 
underlying factor taken into account in earlier cases, it was not an 
96. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
97. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959). 
98. Id. at 375. 
99. "It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are 
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected 
of criminal behavior." 387 U.S. at 530. 
100. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
101. Id. at 311-12 nn.2-4. 
102. Id. at 325. 
103. Id. at 339. 
104. 408 F. Supp. 321, 361-63 n.56 (D.D.C. 1976), aiI'd, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
105. See also Note, Administrative Searches and the Implied Consent Doctrine: 
Beyond the Fourth Amendment, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 91, 111 (1976). It should 
be borne in mind that the Maryland General Assembly has made provisions for 
fines and incarceration as the penalty for those who seek to resist warrantless 
inspection laws. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 48, § 177 (Supp. 1977), which 
provides that violations of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Safety Act can result 
in a five thousand dollar fine and/or up to five years imprisonment for each 
offense. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, §§ 40, 41 & 44 (Supp. 1977), which 
contains both civil and criminal penalties for violation of Maryland's occupa-
tional safety law. 
1978] Administrative Inspections 101 
issue directly addressed in Colonnade or Biswell, nor did it appear to 
be a consideration in those cases. 
D. The Dilemma 
The breadth of the application to be given to Colonnade and 
Biswell remained unsettled as their progeny grew in lower courts. A 
narrow reading of the Colonnade-Biswell exception to fourth 
amendment provisions necessitated testing for several key factors: 
(a) The industry/activity to be inspected must be perva-
sively regulated, perhaps even to include a long-
standing history of governmental control and restric-
tion;106 
(b) Inspection must be "a crucial part of the regulatory 
scheme" necessary to the accomplishment of important 
public interests;107 
(c) The inspection must be conducted pursuant to a valid 
statute which implements "a regulatory inspection 
system of business premises that is carefully limited in 
time, place and scope";108 and 
(d) The inspections for compliance must pose only limited 
threats to the citizens' justifiable expectations of 
privacy. 109 
Proponents of a restrictive interpretation of the Colonnade-
Biswell exception found support for their position in the Supreme 
Court decisions of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States llO and Air 
Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp.,lll both decided 
106. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75-76 (1970); United 
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1972). 
107. 397 U.S. at 75; 406 U.S. at 315-16. 
108. 406 U.S. at 315. 
109. Id. at 317. 
110. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). Almeida-Sanchez held unconstitutional warrantless roving 
searches of automobiles in areas within 100 air miles of United States borders by 
the Border Patrol in seeking to apprehend illegal aliens. In citing Camara, the 
Court stated that "the administrative inspections to enforce community health 
and welfare regulations could be made on less than probable cause to believe 
that particular dwellings were the sites of particular violations." Id. at 270. Yet, 
the Court observed: 
The search in the present case was conducted in the unfettered discretion 
of the members of the Border Patrol, who did not have a warrant, 
probable cause, or consent. The search has embodied precisely the evil 
the Court saw in Camara when it insisted that the discretion of the 
official in the field be circumscribed by obtaining a warrant prior to the 
inspection. 
Id. Both Colonnade and Biswell were held inapplicable because the people 
stopped were not engaged in any regulated or licensed business. Id. at 271. 
111. 416 U.S. 861 (1974). The Court upheld a warrantless entry by a state health 
inspector upon the outdoor premises of a manufacturer for the purpose of making 
air pollution tests. In rejecting the manufacturer's challenge based on 
unreasonable search grounds, the Court maintained its adherence to Camara 
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after Colonnade-Biswell. These cases indicated affirmation of the 
Camara-See position although neither turned on such adherence. 
Conversely, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,112 a case involving 
warrantless vehicle stops at fixed checkpoints near the Mexican 
border, the Court explicitly found the Camara area warrant 
approach inapt because a warrant would not have provided any 
additional notice to the individuals who were stopped, nor was there 
any uncertainty as to the authority of the inspectors or the scope of 
their inspections. Yet, in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,113 the 
Court held that warrantless Internal Revenue Service intrusions into 
a businessman's office were unreasonable unless authorized by a 
valid search warrantp4 The Camara-See rule was again applied as 
the Colonnade-Biswell exception was ruled inapplicable. Thus, the 
confusion continued. 
Of particular note in describing the dilemma faced by lower 
courts were Occupational Safety and Health Act1l5 (OSHA) cases, 
which became the principal battleground on the constitutionality of 
warrantless administrative inspections. These cases split both ways 
in the lower courts on the breadth of application issue,116 As a result, 
the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue in Marshall v. 
Barlow's, Inc,l17 
E. The Barlow Decision 
Barlow, the president of an electrical and plumbing installation 
concern in Idaho, refused to allow an OSHA inspector warrantless 
accessllB to his business premises. The government obtained a court 
order to enter and inspect the premises, but Barlow again refused to 
permit any inspection. Barlow then sought an injunction against 
these OSHA attempts to conduct warrantless inspections. A three-
and See but ruled that they were not applicable in this case. Id. at 864. Instead, 
the Court relied upon the open fields exception to the fourth amendment. See 
generally Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
112. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). The Court found that the government officers' authority was 
readily apparent as the roadblocks were permanent in nature. Id. at 565. The 
officers were in full dress uniform and official signs were posted as far as one 
mile ahead alerting motorists to the roadblock. Id. at 545-46. For a critical 
comment, see Alien Checkpoints and the Troublesome Tetralogy; United States 
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 257 (1976). 
113. 97 S. Ct. 619 (1977). 
114. Id. at 628-29. 
115. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (1976). See Comment, OSHA v. The Fourth Amendment: 
Should Search Warrants Be Required for "Spot Check" Inspections?, 29 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 283 (1977). 
116. Warrantless searches by OSHA inspectors were found to be unconstitutional by 
some courts. E.g., Dunlop v. Sandie Die and Cartridge Co., 4 OSHC 1569 (D.N.M. 
1976); In re Rupp Forge Company, 4 OSHC 1487 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Brennan v. 
Gibson's Products, Inc. of Plano, 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976). Contra, 
Dunlop v. Able Contractors, Inc., 4 OSHC 1110 (D. Mont. 1975); Brennan v. 
Buckeye Industries, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974). 
117. 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978). 
118. Access was sought on the basis of authorization contained at 29 U.S.C. §657(a) 
(1976). 
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judge, federal district court1l9 agreed with his contention that 
Congress did not have the authority to obviate the Constitution by 
empowering OSHA representatives to conduct warrantless inspec-
tions. The court held that OSHA's warrantless inspection provisions 
were violative of the fourth amendment. In arriving at its decision, 
the court faced the familiar dilemma of fitting Colonnade-Biswell 
and Camara-See into some orderly structure. The court resolved this 
problem by holding that the Camara-See warrant requirement for 
public health and safety inspections was the rule. Exceptions on the 
basis of the Colonnade-Biswell analysis were strictly confined to 
"the Camara categorization of 'certain carefully defined classes of 
cases.' "120 From there it logically followed that OSHA's application 
to all businesses engaged in interstate commerce was far broader 
than any allowable exception envisioned by Camara, and was 
certainly not analogous to the Colonnade liquor industry's histori-
cally close supervision or with the Biswell gun industry's perva-
sively regulated business. l2l The government was quick to appeal 
this adverse ruling and cited in its brief to the Supreme Court the 
potential implications, at both state and federal levels, on health and 
safety inspections for the regulation of drugs, mining, cosmetics, 
food and water, pesticides, transportation media, pipelines, etc.122 
In a five-to-three decision,123 the Supreme Court upheld the three-
judge panel by ruling that, absent consent by the owner of a 
business, OSHA inspectors were required to obtain a warrant before 
inspecting the premises. The majority opinion of Justice White 
traced the Court's decisions in Camara, See, Colonnade and Biswell 
and concluded, "[t]he clear import of our cases is that the closely 
regulated industry of the type involved in Colonnade and Biswell is 
the exception. The Secretary [of Labor] would make it the rule."124 
In describing the flexible standard of reasonableness against 
which probable cause for issuance of a warrant..to inspect would be 
measured, the Court explicitly stated that "[p ]robable cause in the 
criminal law sense is not required."125 Camara and See were 
specifically reaffirmed and quoted.126 The Court restated its 
objection to statutes that placed broad inspection discretion in 
public officials.127 In answer to the Secretary of Labor's argument 
119. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1977); aff'd sub nom. Marshall 
v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978). 
120. Id. at 440. 
121. Id. at 440-41. 
122. Brief for Petitioner at 49 n.25. 
123. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978). Suit was originally brought by 
President Ford's Secretary of Labor, W.J. Usery. With the election of President 
Carter, Usery was replaced by Ray Marshall, under whose name the appeal was 
taken to the Supreme Court. 
124. Id. at 1821. 
125. Id. at 1824. 
126. Id. at 1820-21. 
127. Id. at 1825-26. 
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that a warrant would merely track the statute, the Court responded 
that "a warrant would then and there advise the owner of the scope 
and objects of the search, beyond which limits the inspector is not 
expected to proceed."128 Colonnade and Biswell were characterized 
as "responses to relatively unique circumstances"129 where histori-
cal governmental regulation left businessmen with little expectation 
of ppvacy when they voluntarily chose to engage in those trades. 
The majority opinion also addressed the argument raised by the 
government that an adverse ruling on OSHA inspections would 
have far-reaching implications on other legislation seeking to protect 
the public health and welfare. OSHA was distinguished because its 
scope was too broad, applying to all industries engaged in interstate 
commerce.130 Moreover, most of the other statutes cited by the 
SecretaryI3I were directed "to a single industry, where regulations 
might already be so pervasive that a Colonnade-Biswell exception to 
the warrant requirement could apply."132 The Court did not rule on 
the constitutionality of any laws except OSHA itself, reserving 
judgment of these other statutes until they actually come into 
dispute. Nevertheless, the strength of the affirmation of Camara-See 
as the rule and the characterization of Colonnade-Biswell as the 
narrow exception leave little doubt as to the tests that the Court will 
apply in the future. 
In its defense of OSHA, the government warned of the many 
violations that would now go undetected. This argument, reminis-
cent of similar warnings in Frank,133 Camara and See,134 was 
promptly rejected by the Court in its affirmation of the warrant 
requirement for an administrative inspection under a flexible 
probable cause standard.135 The Court reiterated its belief that most 
businessmen would continue to comply voluntarily with the access 
provisions of OSHA.136 For those who did not, the Court envisioned 
128. [d. at 1826. 
129. [d. at 1821. 
130. [d. 
131. [d. at 1825 n.19. 
132. [d. at 1825. 
133. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372 (1959). 
134. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
135. 98 S. Ct. at 1822. 
136. [d. 
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resort to ex parte warrants, which would place no excessive burden 
on government agents while preserving the element of surprise 
which was claimed as necessary to effective enforcement of 
OSHA.137 
There was, however, one issue that the Court left unanswered. 
OSHA has no provision for seeking the issuance of a search 
warrant. One lower court138 upheld the validity of OSHA by the 
judicial interpretation that it was the intent of "Congress to 
authorize objected-to OSHA inspections only when made by a search 
warrant issued by a United States Magistrate or other judicial 
officer of the third branch under probable cause standards 
appropriate to administrative searches - that is, in a constitutional 
manner."139 The three-judge panel that heard the Barlow case below 
chose instead to "decline the invitation to judicially redraft an 
enactment of Congress." 140 The Supreme Court, however, skirted this 
issue in a footnote 141 at the close of its opinion. The Court first 
observed that the issue was not raised. It proceeded to note that if 
the compulsory process obtained by the OSHA inspector after he 
was first denied access satisfied fourth amendment standards, and if 
it was the functional equivalent of a warrant, then the inspection 
137. Id. Justice Stevens dissented in Barlow, taking the view that the fourth 
amendment "Warrant Clause has no application to routine, regulatory inspec-
tions of commercial premises. If such inspections are valid, it is because they 
comport with the ultimate reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment." 
Id. at 1828. See also Lebedun v. State, 283 Md. 257, 390 A.2d 64 (1978), 
which favorably cites the Barlow dissent while distinguishing between the 
warrant and the reasonableness clauses of the fourth amendment. 
138. Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., of Plano, 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976). 
See Note, Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless OSHA Inspections, 11 
SUFFOLK L. REV. 156 (1976). 
139. Id. at 162. 
140. 424 F. Supp. at 441. See Comment, OSHA v. The Fourth Amendment: Should 
Search Warrants Be Required For "Spot Check" Inspections?, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 
283, 304-05 (1977), for one suggested legislative approach to remedy OSHA's 
defective inspection provisions. 
141. 98 S. Ct. at 1827 n.23. 
Id. 
The District Court did not address the issue whether the order for 
inspection that was issued in this case was the functional equivalent of a 
warrant, and the Secretary has limited his submission in this case to the 
constitutionality of a warrantless search of the Barlow establishment 
authorized by § 8(a). 
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was constitutional. 142 This is an interesting point, one that may 
result in additional litigation of OSHA.143 
III. MARYLAND LAWS IN THE WAKE OF BARLOW 
It is difficult to see how the virtually unrestricted authority to 
inspect, which various Maryland administrative inspection statutes 
contain, can be sustained in the light of the clear restatement of the 
law found in the Barlow decision. Consider, for example, these words 
of authorization appearing in some Maryland statutes: 
[T]he Secretary may enter all places where bees, bee 
products, supplies, or appliances used in apiaries are kept. 144 
The Secretary shall sample, inspect, test and make 
analyses of commercial feed distributed in the state at any 
time and place and to the extent the Secretary considers 
necessary to ensure compliance with this subtitle. 145 
142. In the eyes of the Court, the existence of a search warrant cannot be minimized. 
During the same Term as the Barlow decision, two other cases of great 
importance regarding search warrants were resolved. The first was Michigan v. 
Tyler, 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978). There, a conviction on an arson conspiracy charge 
was overturned because the vital evidence was obtained through a warrantless 
search of the fire scene after the blaze was extinguished and the exigent 
circumstances justifying warrantless access had passed. The Court cited 
Camara, See and Barlow in holding that "[tJhe showing of probable cause 
necessary to secure a warrant may vary with the object and intrusiveness of the 
search, but the necessity for the warrant persists." Id. at 1948. This comports 
with the second decision, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978). In 
Zurcher, the Court upheld a search under warrant of a newspaper office. The 
challenge was based on the violation of the "reasonableness" required by the 
fourth amendment as well as on the violation of the first amendment rights of a 
newspaper. In answer, the Court stated that "[uJnder existing law, valid 
warrants may be issued to search any property, whether or not occupied by a 
third party, at which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentali-
ties, or evidence of a crime will be found." Id. at 1975-76 (emphasis in original). 
And later in the same opinion, the Court noted, "Camara and See . .. held that a 
warrant is required where entry is sought for civil purposes, as well as when 
criminal enforcement is involved .... [BJoth cases held that a less stringent 
standard of probable cause is acceptable where the entry is not to secure evidence 
of crime against the possessor." Id. at 1976 (emphasis in original). 
143. In this regard, there may be a fruitful comparison with Maryland statutes. In his 
brief (Brief for Appellee at 6-12), Fitzwater argued that the Boiler and Pressure 
Vessel Safety Act contained no provision for the issuance of an inspection 
warrant, and therefore the inspection authorization was unenforceable. Al-
though this issue was not reached either in Barlow or Fitzwater, it must be 
considered a potential source of future litigation. 
Several lower federal court cases involving OSHA have addressed the issue 
of a magistrate's authority to issue a search warrant for a contested OSHA 
inspection and have upheld the magistrate's authority. See, e.g., Empire Steel 
Mfg. Co. v. Marshall, 437 F. Supp. 873 (D. Mont. 1977); Matter of Northwest 
Airlines, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Marshall v. Chromalloy 
American Corp., 433 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Gilbert and Bennett Mfg., 5 
OSHC 1375 (E.D. lll. 1977). 
144. MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 5-504 (1974). 
145. MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 6-106(a) (1974). 
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The Secretary may enter on any public or private 
premises, including any transportation vehicle, during 
regular business hours to obtain access to commercial feeds 
or to records relating to their distribution. 146 
The Secretary has full access, ingress and egress to and 
from any place of business, any quarry, kiln, factory, barn, 
building, land, or vessel used for manufacturing, storing, 
transporting, or selling agricultural liming materials or 
gypsum. The Secretary may open any container or package 
containing or supposed to contain agricultural liming 
material or gypsum and take any sample for analysis. 147 
107 
In view of the limitations that the Supreme Court has placed on 
administrative inspections, it is unlikely that these statutes can 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
A. Unlimited Search Authorization 
While the congressionally empowered, gun inspection in Biswell 
was accomplished under a statute that the Court found to be 
constitutional, Maryland statutes fall short against a fourth 
amendment test and its inherent safeguards. Statutory limits 
regarding time, place, and scope found in Biswell148 were especially 
important because they fulfilled the same purpose as the warrant 
itself. These limits are absent in the broad authorizations of 
warrantless entry made available to Maryland state officials. 149 In 
addition, the objects of the inspections in Colonnade and Biswell 
were articles representing some inherent threat or danger. When 
balancing the level of privacy invaded and the public interest at 
stake, the articles required governmental controls. The Court in 
Barlow commented that "[c]ertain industries have such a history of 
government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy ... 
could exist for a proprietor-over the stock of such an enterprise."l50 
Regarding the objects of Maryland inspection laws, however, it is 
difficult to conceive of a substantial, inherent threat or dangerous 
146. MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §6-106(e) (1974). 
147. MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 6-304 (1974). 
148. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972). 
149. See text accompanying notes 144-47 supra. In addition, the Maryland 
occupational safety law, MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, §§ 28 et seq. (Supp. 1977), is 
modeled after the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which 
was held by the Barlow decision to be constitutionally deficient. The Government 
in the Barlow appeal to the Supreme Court noted Maryland's occupational safety 
law, and cited Maryland as one of approximately twenty·three states whose 
warrantless inspection provisions were also at stake in the appeal. Brief for 
Petitioner at 49 n.26. 
150. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1821 (1978). 
108 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 8 
instrumentality among the twenty-odd items to which warrantless 
inspections are addressed.151 
B. Expectation of Privacy 
Maryland merchants, businessmen, farmers, and, indeed, the 
average citizen have a reasonable expectation of privacy.152 The 
objects of Maryland's warrantless inspection laws are not so 
inherently dangerous or so pervasively regulated that voluntary 
involvement with those objects constitutes an implied waiver of 
privacy and its attendant fourth amendment rights. Consent by 
implication is not present. Liquor and guns are in a class apart from 
lime, swine, bees, potato seeds, broiler chickens, and pressure boilers. 
On balance, fourth amendment rights are more important than the 
threat perceived from these items by the Maryland General 
Assembly. In Camara, the Court emphasized the st~ndard of 
reasonableness and cautioned that its decision did not foreclose 
warrantless inspections in emergency situations such as the seizure 
of unwholesome food, compulsory smallpox vaccinations, health 
quarantines, and the summary destruction of tubercular cattle. 153 
Absent an emergency situation or some other recognized exception 
to fourth amendment, seach warrant requirements, however, the 
modified probable cause standard that Barlow reaffirmed must be 
met and a suitablv restricted search warrant must he sought. 
The state's interest in promoting its objectives unaer any of its 
present laws authorizing warrantless inspections does not outweigh 
the interests of the affected citizenry to the privacy guaranteed by 
the fourth amendment. Although the sites at which state inspectors 
will intrude are mainly commercial establishments, this is of no 
consequence. The Supreme Court observed in Katz v. United 
151. See note 13 supra. The Maryland citizen who deals in commodities subject to 
warrantless inspections is not on notice of his responsibilities and the inspector's 
duties. Maryland law does not provide for the annual issuance of applicable rules 
and regulations as was found in Biswell. In addition, the Maryland citizen 
subject to these inspections has not willingly agreed to sacrifice some level of his 
constitutional protection in return for a government license to deal in a restricted 
enterprise like liquor and guns. Maryland law affects every businessman and 
farmer regardless of how innocent and commonplace the articles of commerce 
are with which they deal. The articles are not subject to widespread abuse nor 
are they intrinsically dangerous. The mere convenience for an inspector to be 
exempt from the warrant procurement process is not a sufficient justification. 
152. As Justice Douglas contended in his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967), even "spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the Fourth 
Amendment as suspected gamblers. . . . There is, so far as I understand 
constitutional history, no distinction under the Fourth Amendment between 
types of crimes." [d. at 360. In MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-401 (Supp. 
1977), the Maryland General Assembly, although addressing wiretapping, 
expressed its intent as follows: "It is further declared to be the public policy of 
the State that detection of the guilty does not justify investigative methods 
which infringe upon the liberties of the innocent.!' 
153. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967). 
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States 154 that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places"155 
and therefore required that whenever a person harbors a reasonable 
expectation of privacy he is entitled to be free from unreasonable 
government intrusion. In Barlow, the Court stated: "The owner of a 
business has not, by the necessary utilization of employees in his 
operation, thrown open the areas where employees alone are 
permitted to the warrantless scrutiny of Government agents."156 The 
broad reach of the Maryland statutes and their sweeping authoriza-
tion are designed in such a manner as to ensure that the maximum 
number of invasions of privacy will occur, thereby issuing as bold a 
challenge as possible to the courts to strike them down. Legislative 
authorizations of warrantless· administrative inspections present an 
interesting contrast. On the one hand, alleged criminals are afforded 
the full range of a search warrant's fourth amendment protections. 
Yet, the average citizen, farmer, and businessman are shorn of 
proper, constitutional safeguards. 
C. Imposition of an Impartial Magistrate 
Maryland administrative inspection laws often leave the 
decision of what commercial premises are to be inspected, as well as 
when and how the inspections are to be conducted, in the total 
discretion of the state official. There is no imposition of impartial 
judgment, control, or limitation as there is when a magistrate is 
approached for issuance of a warrant. There is no mechanism for 
deflection of abusive or harassing practices. The Barlow decision 
reiterated the importance of the magistrate's function when it 
observed that under OSHA procedures "[t]he authority to make 
warrantless searches devolves almost unbridled discretion upon 
executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the field, 
as to when to search and whom to search."157 
A magistrate, not the many state functionaries that the 
Maryland General Assembly attempts to authorize, must determine 
whether probable cause for an inspection exists. If, as the legislature 
has directed, the subjective good faith of Maryland inspectors is the 
sole check on their powers, fourth amendment protections are 
illusory, resting on the unregulated discretion of the state's agents. If 
challenged, this situation cannot withstand the constitutional test to 
which it must be subjected by the courts. In the context of criminal 
searches, a magistrate must be presented with sufficient information 
upon which he can independently determine whether a constitu-
154. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
155. [d. at 35L 
156. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1822 (1978). 
157. [d. at 1825-26. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), where, 
although probable cause was present, the Court held a search warrant invalid 
because it was not issued by an impartial magistrate but by the State Attorney 
General who was himself involved in the case. 
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tiona! justification for entry exists. 158 So, too, with requested 
administrative inspections, the magistrate must independently 
conclude that the entry is part of a comprehensive, regulatory 
scheme, that it is not an abuse of the state's police powers, and that 
there is a check on the discretion of state inspectors. 159 
D. No Provisions for Issuance of a Warrant 
Administrative inspections in the interests of public health and 
welfare can be pursued by first seeking the voluntary compliance of 
the general public - those ultimately served by any regulatory 
scheme of this nature. Where voluntary compliance is not forthcom-
ing, there must exist a statutory mechanism for seeking the issuance 
of a warrant. Camara, See and Barlow specified that a flexible 
probable cause standard would be sufficient for a warrant authoriz-
ing inspections as part of a regulatory scheme. This presupposes, 
however, some existent statutory provision for obtaining a warrant. 
Presently, Maryland inspection laws do not address the requirement 
of a warrant, or provide a mechanism for seeking a warrant, as a 
part of the regulatory process. This could provide the basis for the 
next round of court challenges to administrative inspections sought 
by Maryland officials who request warrants issued under a flexible 
probable cause standard. 
If the purpose of the regulatory scheme is to safeguard public 
health and welfare, the short delay and burden of the warrant 
process are a small price to pay. Maryland statutes that seek to 
authorize warrantless administrative inspections represent signifi-
cant intrusions on fourth amendment rights, and Maryland citizens 
may well have the constitutional prerogative to reject access to those 
officials who seek entry to their domiciles or business premises 
without warrants. Nevertheless, even if warrantless access is upheld, 
the use of force to obtain that access is illegal.160 For that reason 
158. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971). 
159. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1826 (1978). As the Court said in Beck 
v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), when dealing with probable cause relating to 
warrantless arrests: "If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, only in the discretion of the police." Id. 
at 97. Harassing administrative inspections can just as easily result from 
overenthusiasm of state employees as from their malice. The intrusive, disruptive 
result would be the same to state citizens, regardless of the motivation. 
In Marshall v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 47 U.S.L.W. 2183 (D.N.J. Sept. 7, 1978), a 
federal district court refused to issue a search warrant to OSHA officials. The 
court found the supporting affidavit inadequate and stated: "Approval of a 
search warrant based on this affidavit would amount to a rubber stamp." Id. at 
2184. Thus, resort to the independent judgment of a magistrate can provide an 
adequate barrier to unsubstantiated, attempted intrusions by governmental 
officials. 
160. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970); Camara v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 
(1967). 
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alone, the General Assembly must properly equip state inspectors to 
fulfill their tasks completely. Perhaps some offenders can escape 
detection because of their advance notice of inspection,161 but when 
the purpose is truly regulatory the objective is correction or 
elimination of deficiencies, not penal sanctions against the offender. 
If this objective can be accomplished through the warrant process, 
either by voluntary correction during the warrant process delay or 
by state direction after inspection under a warrant, the public 
interest is served and fourth amendment rights are not violated. As 
long as no exigent circumstances162 exist, and an "industry long 
subject to close supervision and inspection"163 or a pervasively 
regulated business164 are not involved, then the people's interest in 
the protection of their right to privacy is paramount to the state's 
interest in protecting health and welfare. In this regard, a footnote to 
the lower court Barlow decision contains a pointed quotation: 
"Expediency is the argument of tyrants, it precedes the loss of every 
human liberty."165 
161. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1822 (1978). 
162. See Sikma, A Survey of Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement, 21 S.D.L. REV. 
254 (1976) and text accompanying note 153 supra. 
163. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970). 
164. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). 
165. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437, 441 n.4 (D. Idaho 1977), aff'd sub nom. 
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978). 
On September 22, 1978, the Attorney General of Maryland issued an opinion 
declaring that state health officials have the authority to conduct warrantless 
inspections of licensed nursing homes and hospitals in order to ensure 
compliance with MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 562 (1971), which deals with minimum 
safety and sanitation standards in nursing homes and hospitals. Md. Att'y Gen. 
Op., Daily Record, October 7, 1978 at 4, col. 2. The Attorney General found 
statutory authority to conduct these inspections in MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 36B 
(1971) (the opinion cites § 37B, presumably a typographical error since there is no 
§ 37B and because the quoted language in the opinion conforms to § 36B); art. 43, 
§ 561(a) (Supp. 1977). The Attorney General also declared that these particular 
inspections "clearly fall into the exception recognized in" Biswell and 
Colonnade, and distinguished these inspections from those in Barlow. His 
rationale for finding such an exception was "the longstanding and pervasive 
regulation" by the state in the health care facilities area, which the Attorney 
General argued. was "sufficiently analogous to the regulation of firearms and 
alcohol" found in Biswell and Colonnade. 
The opinion can be criticized on two specific grounds. First, the opinion 
missed the point of the line of Supreme Court cases from Camara and See 
through Barlow. The same analysis used in this Comment to distinguish other 
Maryland warrantless administrative inspections from those in Biswell and 
Colonnade is applicable here. Second, the two statutes relied on by the Attorney 
General for inspection authority to enforce § 562 do not relate to § 562. Section 
36B inspections do not refer to health care facilities but apply to "any industrial 
plant, place of business or public premises," and the inspections are limited to 
certain problem areas delineated in § 36A. Section 561(a) applies to health care 
facilities but authorizes warrantless inspections only for the purpose of ensuring 
compliance with construction standards. Thus, unlike Biswell or Colonnade. 
there is no specific statute authorizing warrantless administrative inspections 
under ~ fl62. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR LEGISLATIVE CORRECTION 
The newly revised Boiler and Pressure Vessel Safety Actl66 now 
provides for all-encompassing, warrantless inspections. This Act is 
in operation along with various other Maryland statutes, such as the 
Maryland equivalent of OSHA,167 that also authorize warrantless 
inspections. As the trial court held in the Fitzwater boiler explosion 
case, the attempted authorization of health and safety inspections 
without search warrants is violative of the fourth amendment. This 
point is particularly well-taken with respect to Maryland's adminis-
trative inspection statutes where few limitations on an inspector's 
discretion are imposed in substitution for the protections of a 
warrant. In view of the decisions handed down by the Supreme 
Court, including its recent ruling in Barlow, and the warning of the 
circuit court in Fitzwater, the Maryland General Assembly should 
act to include provisions for the procurement of search warrants in 
all inspections. As an added safeguard, words of limitation 
regarding the time, place, and scope of an inspection should be 
included in each statute where inspection authorization is ad-
dressed.16s It must be remembered that Camara, See and Barlow 
represent a compromise by the Court. The validity of the public 
interest, balanced against the intrusive inspection sought, established 
the level of probable cause necessary for issuance of a warrant. 
Despite this compromise position, which has evolved through the 
several Supreme Court decisions in this area, Maryland statutes on 
administrative inspections still permit virtually unchecked, warrant-
less probes, thereby violating what appears to be a clear mandate. 
The flexible probable cause standard evolving out of the Camara, 
See and Barlow decisions would not jeopardize the accomplishment 
of the objectives desired by present inspection laws. Voluntary 
compliance by citizens and businessmen would serve to fulfill the 
overwhelming majority of inspection needs, and the state would 
have to invoke the warrant process only on a limited basis. When 
surprise or previously encountered rejections or delays are involved, 
the area warrants169 of Camara-See or the "ex parte warrants"170 of 
Barlow can be obtained in advance. Inclusion of a warrant provision 
will not unduly burden regulatory officials. l71 As the law now 
stands, inspectors without a warrant cannot force entry and, 
therefore, the regulatory purpose may not be fulfilled, thus providing 
166. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48, §§ 167-180 (Supp. 1977). 
167. MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, §§ 28 et seq. (Supp. 1977). 
168. The Court in Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978), stated that a balance 
between the need for obtrusive inspections on the one hand and the desire for 
personal privacy by the individual on the other "is usually achieved by broad 
legislative or administrative guidelines specifying the purpose, frequency, scope 
and manner of conducting the inspections." Id. at 1949. 
169. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967). 
170. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1822 (1978). 
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one more reason why the General Assembly should arm inspectors 
with the power to obtain a warrant. 
In the absence of legislative action, the issue of the constitution-
ality of the Maryland inspection statutes will have to be faced by the 
courts. In terms of the cost to citizens and the shortcomings of a 
truly regulatory procedure without provision for obtaining a 
warrant, amendment of the various laws is the positive course. 
Revision of the statutes to provide for issuance of a warrant is a 
legislative. function, not one for the courts172 to judicially provide or 
infer. 
V. CONCLUSION 
If the Fitzwater case were to be retried today under the revised 
statute, the constitutional issue would have to be squarely faced. In 
that event, it seems inevitable that this or any other Maryland 
administrative inspection statute authorizing an entry without a 
search warrant would be struck down as unconstitutional. This 
would leave Maryland without any effective health and safety 
controls until the General Assembly could modify current, inade-
quate inspection statutes for situations where voluntary compliance 
was withheld. The added burden that would be placed on state 
officials by present correction of statutes would be inconsequential, 
while the advantages of preserving constitutional protections 
against potentially abusive, discretionary inspections would be 
great. Considering the ease and simplicity of preemptive, corrective 
action that could be undertaken now, a legislative initiative is in 
order and should be encouraged in the current session of the General 
Assembly. 
Robert J. Liberatore 
171. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470-71 (1971), the Supreme Court, 
on the related topic of the burden on police in obtaining warrants for seizure of 
evidence, stated: "The requirement of a warrant to seize imposed no inconven· 
ience whatever, or at least none which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal 
system that regards warrantless searches as 'per se unreasonable' in the absence 
of 'exigent circumstances.' " 
172. As Justice Clark stated in Clark, Some Notes on the Continuing Life of the 
Fourth Amendment, 5 AM. J. CRIM. LAw 275, 282 (1977): "When you try to make 
up gadgets, try to invent loopholes, try to build bypasses to get by the fourth 
amendment, then you not only do disservice to yourself, but you will eventually 
destroy both the Judicial system itself and the liberties that we all enjoy." 
